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Recent Developments
Forfeiture of Derivative Contraband Under the
Contraband Seizure Act and the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970:
United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S
The Mercedes automobile of the claimant was seized in the course of a
drug raid on the home of the claimant and her husband. Heroin was
discovered during the search and resulted in charges against claimant's
husband for possession of heroin. The partial remains of four marihuana
cigarette butts, found in the ashtray of the car that was parked in the garage
at the time of the search, were the basis of the federal forfeiture action that
was the subject of this case.' The raid was conducted in execution of a
federal warrant for the search of the house. Forfeiture was granted to the
government on its unopposed motion for summary judgment. That
1. United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1978). 49 U.S.C.A. § 781
(1963 & Supp. 1979) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful (1) to transport, carry, or convey any contraband article in,
upon, or by means of any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft; (2) to conceal or possess any contraband
article in or upon any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft, or upon the person ofanyone in or upon any
vessel, vehicle, or aircraft; or (3) to use any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft to facilitate the
transportation, carriage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale,
barter, exchange, or giving away of any contraband article.
(b) As used in this section, the term "contraband article" means-(I) Any narcotic drug which has been or is possessed with intent to sell or offer
for sale in violation of any laws or regulations of the United States dealing there-
with; or which has been acquired or is possessed, sold, transferred, or offered
for sale, in violation of any laws of the United States dealing therewith; or
which has been acquired by theft, robbery, or burglary and carried or
transported within any Territory, possession, or the District of Columbia, or
from any State, Territory, possession, the District of Columbia, or the Canal
Zone, to another State, Territory, possession, the District of Columbia, or the
Canal Zone; or which does not bear appropriate tax-paid internal-revenue stamps
as required by law or regulations; [or]
(2) Any firearm, with respect to which there has been committed any violation of
any provision of the National Firearms Act or any regulation issued pursuant
thereto; or
(3) Any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeit coin or obligation or other
security of the United States or of any foreign government; or any material or
apparatus, or paraphernalia fitted or intended to be used, or which shall have
been used, in the making of any such falsely made, forged, altered, or counter-
feit coin or obligation or other security;, or
(4) Any cigarette, with respect to which there has been committed any violation
of Chapter 114 of Title 18, or any regulation issued pursuant thereto.
49 U.S.C. § 782 (1976) authorizes seizure of vehicles used in violation of 49 U.S.C.A. § 781 (1976):
Any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft which has been or is being used in violation of any
provision of section 781 of this title, or in, upon, or by means of which any violation of said
section has taken or is taking place, shall be seized and forfeited: Provided, That no vessel,
vehicle, or aircraft used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of business as
such common carrier shall be forfeited under the provisions of this chapter unless it shall
appear that (1) in the case of a railway car or engine, the owner, or (2) in the case ofany other
such vessel, vehicle, or aircraft, the owner or the master of such vessel or the owner or
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motion was supported by an affidavit2 sworn by the special agent of the
Drug Enforcement Administration who conducted the search. Claimant
made no appearance before the district court, nor did she file a counter-
affidavit. On appeal, claimant did not allege lack of notice of the hearing or
lack of opportunity to file opposing affidavits or inability to appear at the
hearing. The issue on appeal was the sufficiency of the agent's affidavit for
the grant of the motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's holding.
The historical development of forfeiture actions has been traced back
at least as far as Roman law and its desire for revenge against agents of
injury or death.3 The form of vengeance was the giving up of the agent of
harm, the deodand, to God, through the Church on behalf of the king, to
be offered for the good of the soul of the person harmed.4 Things-in-
motion that caused harm to persons were all eventually considered to be
appropriate objects of forfeiture in English common law, whether they be a
servant, a cart, a falling tree, or a ship. 5 While some intellectual strain
occurred in the rationale that an inanimate object is guilty of an offense,
the law of forfeiture nevertheless operated on that premise.6
Forfeiture proceedings in the United States have generally been
governed by rules of civil procedure and have been wholly statutory in
conductor, driver, pilot, or other person in charge of such vehicle or aircraft was at the time of
the alleged illegal act a consenting party or privy thereto: Provided further, That no vessel,
vehicle, or aircraft shall be forfeited under the provision of this chapter by reason of any act or
omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed or omitted by any person
other than such owner while such vessel, vehicle, or aircraft was unlawfully in the possession
of a person who acquired possession thereof in violation of the criminal laws of the United
States, or of any State.
2. The text of the affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment was, in part:
I personally searched said vehicle at said location on said date and in the ashtray, located in
the area of the vehicle commonly referred to as the "dashboard," I found the partial remains
of four (4) cigarette butts, which appeared, in my experience, to be Marihuana. I have been a
Special Agent for the Drug Enforcement Administration for approximately eight (8) years
(including its predecessor agencies) and I have spent one (1) year as a Criminal Investigator
for the United States Bureau of Customs prior to that. I have seen and smelled Marihuana on
hundreds of occasions and I am very familiar with its appearance and aroma.
United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 197 (6th Cir. 1978).
3. 0. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW (Howe ed. 1963). It was Holmes' view that the vengeance was
gradually extended from the person who was the direct cause of the harm, to a master ifa slave caused a
harm, to the owner of an animal if the animal caused a harm. The generalization also encompassed the
owners of those things that caused harm if the things moved. Holmes found more to his vengeance
theory than he found in the major competing theory of compensation as the basis of the forfeiture, d,
at 5-33.
4. Id. at 23.
5. Id. at 24.
6. Holmes quoted the oft-repeated language of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall:
This is not a proceeding against the owner; it is a proceeding against the vessel for an
offence committed by the vessel; which is not the less an offence, and does not the less subject
her to forfeiture, because it was committed without the authority and against the will of the
owner. It is true that inanimate matter can commit no offence. But this body is animated and
put in action by the crew, who are guided by the master. The vessel acts and speaks by the
master. She reports herself by the master. It is, therefore, not unreasonable that the vessel
should be affected by this report.
Id. at 27, citing United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 234 (1844).
1008
FORFEITURE
character.7 Recently, some federal statutes have treated some forfeitures as
criminal proceedings! Forfeiture actions were thought to be civil in
character since they were proceedings in rem rather than in personam.9 Yet
the specific relationship in forfeiture law between the two types of
proceedings, civil and criminal, has been the subject of extensive and long
debate.'0 On the basis of the observation that forfeiture did, in fact,
penalize the owner even though the proceeding was ostensibly civil, the
term "quasi-criminal" was adopted by the United States Supreme Court as
early as 1886 in Boyd v. United States." In that decision the Court held
that because
suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offences
against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are within
the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution, and of that portion of the Fifth Amendment
which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself ... .
The appropriate standards for protection of constitutional rights are in a
state of uncertainty given the uncertainty regarding the classification of
forfeiture proceedings as civil, criminal, or "quasi-criminal." 3
The object of the forfeiture action is also variously characterized. A
major distinction is between derivative contraband and contraband per
se.' 4 Contraband per se is an object the mere possession of which is
prohibited. 5 Derivative contraband is an object that is seizable by virtue of
its association with contraband per se.' 6 The justification of seizure of
derivative contraband has been (1) that the loss of the object makes the
illegal activity more expensive and, hence, is a deterrent to that activity; (2)
that the unavailability of the object makes the illegal activity difficult if not
7. Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62 CoRMa L. REv. 768,769
(1977).
8. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 901 (a), 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976); Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 408, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (a)(2X1976). Relevant rules
include FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2), 31(e), 32(b)(2), and 54(b)(5).
9. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931); Advisory
Committee's Comments to the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 56
F.R.D. 143, 180 (1972).
10. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886); Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures:A Frameworkfor Constitutional
Analysis, 60 MiNN L. Rv. 379 (1976).
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
12. Id. at 634. The Court's holding with respect to the self-incrimination portion of the fifth
amendment was related to the compulsory production of the party's private books and papers to be
used against him in a forfeiture proceeding.
13. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 699. The Court defined contraband per se as "objects the possession ofwhich, without
more, constitutes a crime."
16. Id. The Court considered derivative contraband to be objects, the possession of which was
not even remotely criminal, but which were put to an illegal use.
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impossible to continue; or (3) that the costs of investigating and enforcing
the law can be recouped by the seizure or unpaid taxes may be collected.
Forfeitures are considered criminal penalties for purposes of
triggering the protection of certain constitutional rights. Nevertheless, the
statutes are deemed predominantly civil in that it has been held
constitutional for the burden of proof to shift to the claimant once the
government agency has made a showing of probable cause.' 8 "Probable
cause" in this context means a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,
supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.'
9
The libel complaint needs to meet only minimal requirements for the
initiation of forfeiture proceedings. Specifically, the complaint must be
verified by oath or affirmation, it must describe with reasonable
particularity the property in question, and it must state that the property is
within the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is brought.20
Therefore, the filing of the libel complaint, if sufficient to show probable
cause for seizure, shifts the burden to the claimant to reply. The claimant
has two courses open to him-challenge the adequacy of the forfeiture
complaint or seek remission or mitigation of the forfeiture. The latter
alternative is open to the claimant for a forfeiture already accomplished
and it is said to be a grant of executive discretionary power to relieve the
harshness of the forfeiture statutes.2' The availability of the alternative of a
remission petition has been construed as an expression of Congressional
intent to have remission be the sole mechanism for affording leniency. 22
Judicial review of remission and mitigation decisions is restricted to the
matter of whether there is statutory authority for such decisions and not
the matter of the merits of the decision. 23 A governmental agency,
however, may not rely on the availability of administrative relief as a
means of nullifying a claimant's due process right to a speedy and fair
forfeiture adjudication.24
17. State v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); MeKeehan v.
United States, 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. One 1965 Buick, 392 F,2d 672 (6th Cir,
1968), vacated sub nom. Dean v. United States, 402 U.S. 937 (1971).
18. United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 2-Door Hardtop, 529 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1976).
19. United States v. (One) (1) 1971 Chevrolet Corvette Automobile, 496 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1974),
20. FED. R. Civ. P. Supplemental Rule C(2). The Supplemental Rules apply to admiralty and
maritime claims within the meaning of FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h) and to those statutory condemnation
proceedings analogous to maritime actions in rem whether within admiralty and maritimejurisdiction
or not. FED. R. Civ. P. Supplemental Rule A.
21. United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1964). This case dealt in
particular with the Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), and Pub. L.
No. 89-554,80 Stat. 378 (1966) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§551-59 (1976)),and its tempering effects
on the Contraband Seizure Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-89 (1976). Remission is the only remedy available to
the owner of forfeited property and it is a remedy that has been available in the United States since
1790. The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976), has a provision similar to the Administrative
Procedure Act for remission or mitigation of penalties.
22. United States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch Nisku, 548 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1977).
23. United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.), cert. denled, 409 U.S,
980 (1972).
24. Boston v. Stephens, 395 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
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In light of the intricacies of forfeiture law, the recent case of United
States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S 25 presents a current statement of the
position of the Sixth Circuit in this area of the law. The decision appeared
in a climate that is tending to temper the severity of the forfeiture of
derivative contraband of innocent owners26 and, thus, it represents a rather
harsh position on the part of this court. The harshness is particularly
evident since the court had eliminated the "fiction" of a forfeiture being an
action against an inanimate object in its fairly recent decision in
McKeehan v. United States.27 In other words, while precedents make the
decision in One 1975 Mercedes 280S a technically correct one, a different
outcome is justifiable and probably preferable.
The issue before the court in One 1975 Mercedes 280S was whether
the affidavit by the government agent concerning the presence of the
"6partial remains of four Marihuana cigarette butts" in the ashtray of
claimant's car constituted a sufficient showing by the government agency
to justify a grant of summary judgment in the forfeiture action.28 Assuming
that the affidavit was reasonably particular in describing the object, that
unquoted portions of the libel stated that the property was within the
jurisdiction of the court, and that the property was of the type that could be
seized under the relevant statute, the Contraband Seizure Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 782, the government could be considered to have shown probable cause
for seizure of the car. The burden had at that point shifted to the claimant
either to challenge the libel or to allow the forfeiture to proceed and initiate
a remission petition. Claimant could not save her property by silence.
Claimant had two failing arguments and one colorably successful
argument on appeal. The failing arguments were first, that the statutory
requirements of 49 U.S.C.A. § 781 were not met,29 and second, that the
amount of marihuana discovered was de minimis. 30 Her potentially
successful argument was presented as two separate assignments of error
(1) that she had no intent to distribute marihuana and she had not been
shown to have knowledge of its presence in her car,3 and (2) that the
affidavit was insufficient to support a grant of summary judgment.32
25. United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1978).
26. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); United States v. United
States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Blazer, 563 F.2d
1386 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F.Supp. 1383 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
27. McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971).
28. United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 198 (6th Cir. 1978).
29. Id. Claimant argued that the government had to show that the marihuana was transported
and concealed or possessed in the car. The court held that the statutory elements are disjunctive and
that the mere presence of a controlled substance in the car brought it within the requirements of the
statute. See note 1 supra.
30. United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1978). The court
maintained, with supporting case law, that the drug laws are violated by any measurable amount of a
prohibited narcotic drug. Since "any measurable amount" is sufficient for a criminal conviciton, itwas
sufficient in this case "to support a civil forfeiture under the less onerous burden of proof."
31. Id.
32. Id. at 199.
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In rejecting the first colorably successful contention, the court relied
on Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 33 and United States v.
One 1961 Cadillac34 to the effect that neither intent nor knowledge were
necessary for seizure of a vehicle in which controlled substances were
found. The second contention was found wanting on the basis that
forfeiture actions are quite summary themselves since the burden of proof
is on the owner after the preliminary showing of probable cause. 35 While
the court would not accept the government's argument that probable cause
was adequate for forfeiture no matter what proof was pressed in
opposition by the claimant, absent any response by the claimant, the
showing of probable cause was considered adequate for the granting of the
government's motion for summary judgment.36
The Sixth Circuit began to disentangle the concepts of "guilt" and
"inanimate object" in the course of its decision in McKeehan v. United
States." The court found no valid purpose in pursuing the object in rem
and, hence, determined that the forfeiture was a proceeding in personam
once the fiction of the guilty object was lifted. 38 The court stated its
postion in that case:
In so doing, we are not creating a "legal fiction," but destroying
one. . . . We are characterizing the facts underlying this action as to their
substance. We are following the mandate of the United States Supreme Court
when it has repeatedly held that under certain circumstances a possessor of
chattels is entitled to the protection of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
when civil forfeiture actions take on a quasi-criminal or penal cast.
39
If the forfeiture of the property does not accomplish a valid legislative,
administrative, or revenue purpose then the proceeding must be seen for
what its underlying substance is. The McKeehan court viewed that
underlying substance as a quasi-criminal or penal proceeding deserving
fourth and fifth amendment protections for the property owner .4
33. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
34. 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964).
35. United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 199 (6th Cir. 1978).
36. Id.
37. 438 F.2d 739, 745 (6th Cir. 1971). In that case the souvenir firearms of the claimant were
forfeited because the owner did not register them as required in the National Firearms Act
Amendments of 1968, Pub. L.No. 90-618, § 201, 82 Stat. 1227 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 5841
(1976)). Among the reasons stated by the Sixth Circuit in returning the firearms to the owner was the
lack of valid legislative, administrative, or revenue purposes for pursuing the item in rem.
38. 438 F.2d at 745 (6th Cir. 1971).
39. Id. (citations omitted); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
40. The opinion of the court did not include a discussion of the issue ofcollateral estoppel given
the claimant's acquittal on criminal charges, since that issue was not raised on appeal. MeKeehan v.
United States, 438 F.2d 739, 745-46 (6th Cir. 1971). However, Judge Weick maintained, in his
concurring opinion, that the court could and should consider the matter even though the appellant did
not raise it and he concluded that the Coffey doctrine (Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886))
required that the final determination of the criminal charges against MeKeehan estopped the
subsequent civil forfeiture proceeding. McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739, 746 (6th Cir. 1971)
(Weick, J., concurring). Contra: Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). But cf. One Lot Emerald
Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (dealing with customs regulations, rather than
narcotics or firearms).
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Derivative contraband is uniquely suited to the suspicion that
forfeiture of the property is in essence an in personam proceeding rather
than one in rem. It is the use of the property in furtherance of illegal activity
that brings derivative contraband within the purview of forfeiture
statutes. 1 It is the illegal use of such property that is intended to be
deterred by the penalty of forfeiture of derivative contraband associated
with transportation and possession of prohibited drugs.4 2
Scarcely a forfeiture case is decided without at least a mild expression
of recognition on the part of the court that the sanction is a severe one.43 It
is a legal homily that forfeitures are not favored.44 Hence, it is also
generally acknowledged that statutes which authorize the forfeiture of
derivative contraband must be narrowly construed.45
While the court in One 1975 Mercedes 280S correctly cited Calero-
Toledo for the proposition that neither intent nor knowledge of illegally
used property must be shown for the granting of forfeiture, it ignored
language in the opinion that invited a more lenient posture.4 6 In fact, two
recent United States Supreme Court decisions, while adhering to the
traditional forfeiture doctrines, signal the desire on the part of the Court
that lower federal courts scrutinize the facts of forfeiture cases of derivative
contraband and innocent owners. The Court stated in United States v.
United States Coin & Currency4 7 that "[w]hen the forfeiture statutes are
viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended to impose a
penalty only upon those who are significantly involved in a criminal
enterprise."' Then in Pearson, the Court went to some length to
encourage future decisions exempting the innocent owner from forfeiture
statutes when the facts justify such a result. The dicta made clear the
standards for innocent owner exemption:
[I]t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose
property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity
or consent. . . .Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved
not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but
also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult
to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly
oppressive.49
41. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
42. [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws 2953 (congressional history of 1950 Amendments to49
U.S.C. §§ 781, 782).
43. Eg., United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1978).
44. E-g., United States v. One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. 219 (1939).
45. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339 (1869).
46. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,689-90 (1974); United States v.
One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964).
47. 401 U.S. 715 (1971). The case dealt with money seized from an individual charged with
gambling in order to pay gambling tax and forfeited under I.R.C. § 7302. An issue of retroactive
application of criminal statutes complicated the case.
48. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1971) (citation
omitted).
49. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,689-90 (1974) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
1979] 1013
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
Thus, the standard for innocent ownership consists of proof of three
conditions: the owner (1) was uninvolved in the illegal use; (2) was unaware
of the use of his property for illegal activity; and (3) had done all that could
be reasonably expected of him to prevent the prohibited use of this
property.
Some lower federal courts have applied this three part standard, and,
depending on the facts of the case, have granted50 or denied51 forfeiture. In
attempting to apply the Coin-Pearson standard, a Pennsylvania federal
district court has interpreted the "no negligence" aspect of the standard as
an affirmative duty to prevent illegal use which is only triggered by
knowledge or suspicion of potential wrongdoing.5 2 Furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit has recently reversed a district court's grant of summary
judgment motion in a forfeiture action against a vehicle pursuant to 49
U.S.C. § 782 for its use in transporting a contraband firearm.53 Relying on
(oin and Pearson, the court concluded that the granting of summary
judgment on the facts of that case was clearly erroneous.
Forfeiture law at the time One 1975 Mercedes 280S was decided was
permeated by a clear invitation by the United States Supreme Court for the
lower federal courts to critically examine the facts of forfeiture cases
involving innocent owners. The standard for the innocent owner
exemption was described in broad outline and some courts had begun to
fill in the details of that standard. To the extent that courts have moved
toward a consideration of forfeiture of derivative contraband from
innocent owners as quasi-criminal or penal in nature there is at least a
suggestion that a higher level of proof should be required than a mere
preponderance standard normally appropriate to most civil proceedings.
In that context, the showing of probable cause by the government in One
1975 Mercedes 280S, even though it was unmet by a reply or rebuttal by
the claimant, slipped dangerously close to the taking of property without
compensation and without due process, which is the fifth amendment's
antagonism to forfeitures. One's uneasiness with the court's treatment of
the case is compounded by the fact that the court has the discretion not to
grant Rule 56 summary judgment motions.55 Summary judgment is
50. See, e.g., United States v. One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette, 393 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
51. See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Mercury Cougar XR7, 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C.D. Cal.
1975).
52. United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1383 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
53. 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1976). United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Blazer Vehicle, 563 F,2d 1386
(9th Cir. 1977).
54. Id. at 1391. This case was complicated by the ambiguity in the lower court's decision,
specifically with respect to whether the forfeiture was contested or whether the remission procedure
had not been followed correctly.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 56; Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 345 F.2d 808 (Ct. C. 1965),
rev'd on other grounds, 384 U.S. 424 (1966).
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especially eschewed when state of mind is an issue 6 or where grave, im-
portant, or novel questions of law are involved.57
The law is divided now on the relevance of the good faith or innocence
of the owner of property that is seized in a forfeiture action. The criteria for
justifiable forfeiture are unsettled at this time, but that confusion is a form
of relief from the recognized severity of proceedings which would not take
the owner's innocence into account. As Judge Wisdom stated in his
dissenting opinion in a recent forfeiture case, a rationale that refuses to
take cognizance of the innocence of the owner is "barbaric, a vestigial relic
of the deodand." 58
Marsha Rockey Schermer
56. See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 538 F.2d
180 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
57. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
58. United States v. One 1969 Plymouth Fury Automobile, 509 F.2d 1324, 1325 (5th Cir. 1975)
(Wisdom, J., joined by Brown, C. J., and Ainsworth, Dyer, Clark, and Gee, JJ., dissenting), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975).
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